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1. Motivations
Among many types of medical equipment, ultrasound di-
agnostic systems are widely used because of their conve-
nience and safety. Performing an ultrasound examination
involves good eye-hand coordination and the ability to in-
tegrate the acquired information over time and space. Some
of these specialized skills may lack in some healthcare cen-
ters or for emergency situations. Tele-consultation is there-
fore an interesting alternative to conventional care. Devel-
opment of a high performance remote diagnostic system,
which enables an expert operator at the hospital to examine
a patient at home, in an emergency vehicle or in a remote
clinic, may have a very significant added value. There-
fore a robotic tele-ultrasound system is proposed in order
to realize the examination in small towns or cities with-
out needing highly qualified medical staff. This system for
Robotic Tele-Echography (TER) is designed and developed
by a French consortium composed of universities, hospitals
and industrials companies [28].
Medical robots belong to safety critical systems. In
such systems, the robot shares its working area with opera-
tors (doctors or assistants), and has a close interaction with
the patient. Safety, defined for industrial robots as the pre-
vention of damage to the robot itself and its environment,
and particularly the human component [5], can now be de-
fined as the property of a medical robot to be "free from
unacceptable risk" [13]. Therefore it is necessary to reduce
the risk to an acceptable level with a complete risk man-
agement activity (see the norm [12]). Safety is also pro-
vided by the evidence of safe functionality (completeness
of safety requirements and validation of several checks).
Those activities are based on a system model. Ideally,
the system definition is modelled formally, but the use of
formal methods in industrial development of safe systems
is still rare. A significant barrier is that many formal lan-
guages and formal analysis techniques are unfamiliar and
difficult to understand and to apply for engineers. Devel-
opers must also integrate medical specialists requirements,
and explain them the whole system definition. For these
reasons, existing techniques must be considered. UML
(Unified Modelling Language) notation fulfill these claims,
and is now a standard in system and software engineering.
It is also well adapted to robotic systems [4].
In this presentation we will focus on risk analysis
(which is a part of risk management [12]) and also on the
importance of the human factors. The integration of hu-
man factors in this activity is still in work [10, 3]. But it
is obvious that the interaction between the human and the
technology in a medical robotic system, plays a major role
in safety and therefore in risk management.
In scope of the TER project, we have studied the rela-
tionships between the main activities of risk management
including human factors and system definition in UML.
First, we present an overview of the tele-ultrasound system.
Second, the risk analysis of the TER slave site is detailed
in three points. A first step is to present general concepts
of risk management. A second step concerns system defi-
nition, and human factors studies as task analysis and func-
tion allocation. Finally, risk assessment is presented with
the use of an analytical method, Failure Modes Effects and
Critically Analysis (FMECA).
2. Tele-ultrasound system overview
The aim of this paper is not to present the whole devel-
opment process of the TER system, but to focus on safety
points. Hence we present in this section most of the design
choices that have been realized even if next parts deal with
some of this points (how they have been chosen, how they
are implemented, etc.).
The tele-operated TER system allows the expert
physician to move by hand a virtual probe in a natural and
unconstrained way and safely reproduce this motion on the
distant robotic site where the patient is. Then, mainly based
on the echographic images and force information he re-
ceives back, the expert operator can move the virtual probe
to control the real one, see Figure 1. The real probe is
placed on the slave robot end-effector (see figure 2). Posi-
tion and force information are transmitted bi-directionally
(together with live visual and audio). The slave robot ex-
ecutes the orders sent from the master site. A non-expert
operator is located close to the patient and supervises the
procedure that he can interrupt. The patient can at any time
communicate with him or with the expert. From clinician
side, the haptic control station is developed to give more
realistic environment and finer command of what remotely
occurs, it integrates a PHANToM device (from SensAble
Device Inc) which has 6 degrees of freedom (dof) and ren-
ders 3D-force information. Position and orientation track-
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Figure 1 : TER system overview
Figure 2 : TER slave robot
ing of the virtual probe is performed within a workspace
of 16cmx13cmx13cm and with maximum a force of 6.4N.
Real time force feedback information and a virtual geomet-
ric model of the patient are rendered to the expert operator.
From patient side, the slave robot is remotely controlled
by the medical expert, who handles his virtual probe via
the force feedback robot. The precise position of the ul-
trasound probe is provided by an optical localizer and is
sent to the master site where the position is represented as
a visual information. Two IDSN 128kb/s connections are
used; one is for the Visio-phonic data and echographic im-
ages and the other one is for the transmission of the control
information for the slave-robot.
3. Risk Analysis
3.1 Terminology
Risk management can be guaranteed only if the terminol-
ogy is stable and non ambiguous. In the safety analysis
field, different notions are often used and can have different
definitions. Based on recent medical norms and on safety
critical system terminology we propose to apply them to
the medical robotics field.
Harm and risk
Both in generic and medical norms as CEI 300-3-9 [11],
Guide 51 [13] and ISO 14971 [12], a harm is defined as a
physical injury or damage to the health of people, or dam-
age to property or the environment. A harm can be defined
by its gravity (minor, major, sever, etc.) and its probability
of occurrence. Then, risk is defined as the combination of
the probability of occurrence of harm and the severity of
the harm.
Hazard and hazardous situation
In order to describe how accidents appear, the term hazard
is used as an anterior notion i.e. a hazard may result in
an accident. For industrial robotics, hazard was defined as
an energy transfer [18], which is similar to MORT (Man-
agement Oversight and Risk Tree) [15]. Leveson [21] de-
fine hazard as "a state or set of condition of a system that,
together with other conditions in the environment of the
system, will lead inevitably to an accident". To cope with
those different points of view we chose to use the more
generic definition of the Guide51 [13]: a hazard is a po-
tential source of harm. For instance, a sharp edge may be
defined as a hazard, it will not necessary produce a harm, it
depends on the situation. Therefore, a hazardous situation
is a circumstance in which people, property or the environ-
ment are exposed to one or more hazards. This notion can
be compared to the Leveson’s definition of hazard.
Risk management and risk analysis
According to the most recent medical and generic norms
[12, 13], Risk management is the term for all the process
including:
• Risk analysis: system definition, hazard identification
and risk estimation
• Risk evaluation: procedure based on the risk anal-
ysis to determine wether the tolerable risk has been
achieved
• Risk control: procedure based on the two previous ac-
tivity in which protective measures are chosen and im-
plemented in order to reduce risks.
Risk assessment is also used to express risk analysis and
risk evaluation. In the previous norm on risk management
EN 1441 (1997) [8], the generic term was risk analysis for
the whole process. In the new terminology, risk analysis is
the core of the risk management, therefore we focus on this
activity in this paper.
3.2 TER slave control system definition
The first step of a risk analysis concerns the definition and
the descriptions of the system, its boundaries and the in-
tended use. This step is particularly linked with require-
ments analysis and human factors integration. We focus on
two main activities of human factors engineering: the func-
tion allocation and the task analysis. The function alloca-
tion aims at determining the distribution of work between
human actors and machines. It is particularly important to
define non ambiguous and consistent tasks for humans who
are using the robot. Task analysis is conducted to identify
the details of specified tasks, including the required knowl-
edge, skills, attitudes, and personal characteristics required
for successful task performance.
These activities are usually performed with different
algorithms. The allocation should be iterative and can
follow algorithms as in [20, pp.231-236], [1] and [22].
Through this description of function allocation, modeling
furnish basis for task analysis. One of the difficulties is
to model those allocations and to integrate them to system
modeling. The purpose of this section is not to present al-
gorithms for those activities, but to study how UML help in
modelling the specification of the function allocation and
the definition of task analysis.
General Scenario
The first step is to describe the general scenario of the ap-
plication to determine system functions. The UML use
case diagram in figure 3 presents the main use cases during
an ultrasound scan examination. This diagram belongs to
the business modelling (as defined in [14]). The business
is here the real ultrasound scan examination. The busi-
ness modelling permits to increase the understanding of
the business and facilitate communication about the busi-
ness [9], particularly between engineers and doctors. Based
on this diagram, the TER system is later integrated in the
requirement modelling in the next diagrams. In the TER
project, experts have studied the ultrasound scan examina-
tion and particularly the use case Realize Ultrasound Scan,
to determine all the interactions between the doctor ma-
nipulating the probe, and the patient (particularly pressures
and movements on the patient’s body which are critical for
safety). This leads to the choice of a parallel robot struc-
ture (Cf. fig.1) which is different from a serial robot struc-
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Figure 3 : Use case diagram of the business ultrasound scan ex-
amination
ture (like a robot arm). The main safety criteria was to
limit the work envelope and limit the collisions (which are
well-known with robot arms). The difficulty of modelling
the work space (the patient’s body), leads to the choice of
a compliant slave robot, with an actuation by intrinsically
compliant artificial muscles [27]. The other use cases have
also be studied to determine the architecture of the TER
system. For example, the use case Patient Management,
contains scenarios of communication between the patient
and the medical expert which are essential. This led to
choose a bi-directionally visioconference subsystem.
From actual echography to robotic echography
First UML diagrams (use case and object diagrams) show
all the interactions between actors and the system, but also
between actors themselves. An actor characterizes an out-
side user or related set of users who interact with the sys-
tem [2]. It is possible for an actor to be a human user
(like in figure 3) or an external system. This is really use-
ful in socio-technical systems, and particularly in the TER
project. Indeed, such a modelling allows the interactions to
be handled for safety studies. We choose to represent two
external systems as actors: the Master Site and the Robot.
The Master Site replaces the actor Specialist (Cf. fig. 3)
who is in the charge of realizing the examination.
The use case diagram presented on figure 4 shows the
TER slave site in a business modelling view. This model
shows a first allocation of tasks between actors according
to the medical domain. Tasks can be described with col-
laboration or sequence diagrams for each use case. How-
ever, on this diagram, the boundaries of the computer con-
trol system are not defined. We defined the TER Control
System as all the machine parts (computer control system,
actuators, sensors, monitors, etc.) but without the physical
structure of the robot. In order to specify requirements, it
is important to define whether each use case belongs to the
system or not. For example, the use case Robot Manage-
ment includes tasks such as maintenance operations. This
fault prevention operation (preventive maintenance) can be
entirely independent of the TER system or may be assisted
by the system (for example by monitoring the use time of
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Figure 4 : Use case diagram of the TER slave site
TER Control System
Operator
Patient Management
Robot Management
Install / Init Control System
<<include>>
Calibrate Controller
<<include>>
<<include>>
Patient
Master Site
Realize Ultrasound Scan
Slave Robot
Figure 5 : Use case diagram with control system boundaries
critical units). Patient Management is a set of scenarios
that can be clean patient, position patient, or monitor pa-
tient during operation. These use cases imply a collabo-
ration between cognitive ergonomists, medical specialists
and requirement engineers to determine, for each task, how
the system can help the actors to perform the task, make
decisions, diagnose or act. Again the models have to be
understood by all the participants of the development pro-
cess (analysts, designers, etc.).
TER slave control system boundaries
The determination of the system boundaries is a funda-
mental step of requirements analysis, and is entirely linked
with the definition of human tasks. In this step, it should
be determined which of the requirements are system re-
quirements, which are requirements for the operational pro-
cesses associated with the system and which requirements
should be outside the scope of the system [26]. Based
on figure 4, we have chosen use cases that belong to the
computer control system for the TER slave robot. Figure
Specialist Assistant Equipment
Servicer
TER control
system
Slave robot
Patient
Move probe on
Operator
Installing, monitoring
Figure 6 : Class diagram in a business modeling
5 models the computer control system use cases where a
new actor is specified in the class diagram presented in fig-
ure 6: Operator inherits from the Equipment Servicer and
the Specialist Assistant. Some previous use cases as Vi-
sioconference Management (not shown for readability) and
Probe Management have been removed from this use case
diagram (fig. 5) because they don’t belong to or have any
interaction with the computer control system.
On sequence diagram presented in figure 7, the main
scenario of the installation of the whole system is pre-
sented. We present this diagram because most of the in-
teractions between human and technology appear during
this scenario (during the use case Realize ultrasound scan,
human tasks are less numerous). Such diagram help in de-
scribe tasks that humans have to do. For instance the Oper-
ator has to Prepare Patient, which can be extend in position
the patient, put ultrasound scan gel on patient’s body, give
information to the patient, monitor the patient, etc. There-
fore, this diagram and some refinements help in represents
all the tasks.
This modelling of tasks is also useful to determine
a sequence of actions, which can be essential for safety.
Indeed, the sequence of actions presented on figure 7 has
been determined according to functional requirements and
safety requirements. For instance, Connection with master
site has been placed before all the installation procedures
in order to minimize the waiting time (connection can be
long) of the patient with the robot placed on her/his body
(that can create a psychological trouble). Another exam-
ple is the action Set air pressure in artificial muscles com-
ing after all installations and calibrations. Without any air
pressure in artificial muscles, the robot system is safe and
all the installations and checks can be done safely.
On the same diagram it is also important to study in-
terlocks between tasks. The calibration of the controller
depends on the patient corpulence, and this factor influence
also the robot settings (for example the length of the ca-
bles connected from muscles to the slave robot, see figure
1). Hence, it is important to calibrate the controller, first
: Operator
: TER Control
System
: Patient : Robot
Prepare Patient
Calibrate for Patient corpulence
Identify Patient position
Identify Robot configuration
Calibrate Robot
Calculate Patient model
Calculate Robot model
Install
Set air pressure in artificial muscles
Start teleoperation
Install Robot
Connection with Master Site
Figure 7 : Sequence diagram of installation of the whole system
according to the patient body, and then to the robot set-
tings. The order of those actions presented with sequence
diagram is easily readable by non expert modelling.
These models which are essential in a safety critical
project, can directly be used for different safety-dependent
tasks: writing of a user-guide (using the sequence dia-
grams), specification and design of the Human-Machine
Interface (HMI) and furnish models for the specification
of the system. It is important to note that in such robot
systems, HMI includes the robot-human interface (control
panels, teach pendant, computers, etc.) but also the robot
itself (in the TER project the slave robot is always in con-
tact with the patient’s body).
3.3 Hazard identification and risk evaluation
with analytical methods
In order to perform the risk analysis, engineers use several
analytical methods. We have chosen to use both FMECA
(Failure Modes and Effects Criticality Analysis) and FTA
(Fault Tree Analysis), because of their complementarity (a
forward and a backward analysis) and expressiveness (in-
tegration of software, hardware units or human failures).
They are also widely used in robotics [6, 16, 29] and rec-
ommended in both critical systems [21] and norms [11, 12].
An important point which is rarely developed in those
techniques, is the human error analysis. Indeed, this field
has been studied for years in cognitive sciences, but the
notion is still rare in risk management norms. Neverthe-
less, it is often noted that human error can be integrated
in techniques as FMECA and FTA. A first part of this sec-
tion deals with human error, its identification and analysis
with UML modelling. Then, we present some results of our
study with FMECA. In order to be concise we don’t present
any diagram of FTA. This work is still in progress and we
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Figure 8 : Structure of human error analysis method
don’t have enough results on relationships between FTA
and UML. We also don’t present the hazard tables which
must be done during hazard identification step. Moreover,
we focus on risk evaluation, taking account that a complete
presentation of all the models and all the results is impos-
sible in an paper.
3.3.1 Human error analysis
Human error can be defined as a failure of a human to do
a specified action, which results in undesirable outcomes.
The aim of this activity is to reduce the undesirable actions,
their propagation and their outcomes. It leads to the speci-
fication of new requirements, re-design and documentation
production. The complexity of human error classification
and cognitive theory [24] usually lead to the use of design
checklists and guidelines [21]. Human error analysis meth-
ods are also often based on experimentation, simulation,
and on human reliability analysis [17]. But for innovative
projects, it is really difficult to get information on experi-
ence, incident and accident reports. Moreover, guidelines
are not sufficient for new projects as medical robots [30].
For instance, we found nothing on medical robots. Thus,
we had to develop our own accident scenarios. We notice
that a human error is linked with a use case because it ap-
pears during a scenario of use. So the description of the
error can be modelled with a sequence diagram. It is a sce-
nario of a use case with an erroneous message generated
by a human actor. Then, a number of models, theories and
collections of empirical data about human performance and
human error can be useful in deciding which scenarios it
will be important to analyze [25]. This analysis process is
presented in figure 8 adapted from THEA [23], a method
for human error analysis.
A first analysis can be based on the business mod-
els and then on the requirement models (as explained pre-
viously). The business modelling leads to identify er-
rors linked with social interaction whereas the requirement
modelling identifies errors during the use of the system, di-
rectly linked with human-machine interfaces. For instance,
based on the sequence diagram in figure 7, different errors
can be identified:
• Omission, non execution of an expected action: the
operator forget to do Connection with master site
• Action performance error:
– Bad execution of an expected action: the opera-
tor place the patient in a wrong position
– Execution of an action at a wrong instant: the
operator do the Set the air pressure in artificial
muscles before position patient
– Execution of several actions in a wrong se-
quence: the operator can change the order of the
installation and calibration.
• Unknown or unplanned actions: the patient try to
catch the robot.
For each identified error it is possible to describe the sce-
nario with a sequence diagram but also to describe effects
and to present corrective measures (interlocks, checks, use
modification, etc.).
Later, for each HMI proposal, all the potential errors
have to be analyzed in the same way. In the TER project,
the operator is in charge of calibrating the robot controller
in order to calculate robot and patient models (cf. fig. 7).
The proposal interface for this scenario is the use of a 3-
D position sensor manipulated by the operator. The use
of such an interface can produce errors. Based on the se-
quence diagram, we can determine for each message how
it is possible to reduce errors (supervision of the system
and validation of the calculated models) and also produce
a documentation for the procedure. This is detailed with
UML diagram in part 3.3.2. For the TER system, there are
three main HMI on the slave site: a computer, a power con-
trol panel and the robot itself. The human error analysis has
to consider how the human can fail in interacting with those
HMI during a use case scenario. For example, it is impor-
tant to identify what will happen if the operator pushes the
wrong button during a use case. Again, this implies the use
of sequence diagrams. In order to identify scenarios and
system responses to the errors, it is useful to use a state di-
agram (Harel’s statecharts) to model the external black box
behavior to indicate in which state the system is when the
error happens.
As presented here, it is possible to describe human er-
ror with sequence diagrams. But today there isn’t any tools
to integrate errors in the UML models, the description re-
mains qualitative. Moreover, during requirements analysis,
models are not enough refined to identify the error propa-
gation. This can be done later, and particularly during risk
management activities. Indeed during risk analysis, fail-
ures and their effects are analyzed. And it is possible to
integrate human errors in techniques as Failure Modes Ef-
fects and Critically Analysis and Fault Tree Analysis.
3.3.2 Failure Modes Effects and Critically
Analysis (FMECA)
FMECA is a method used for the identification of poten-
tial errors (failure modes) of the examined object (sys-
tem, segment, software/hardware unit) in order to define
and classify their effects (failures) with regard to criticality
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Figure 9 : Main mechanical units of the slave robot (see g. 2)
(also called Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analy-
sis). This is to prevent faults (causes of failure) and thus
weak points in the design which might result in harm. Sec-
ondly, the FMECA is also to furnish results for corrective
measures, and for the determination of operating and ap-
plication conditions of the system. Each failure mode (the
way the component fails) is analyzed, and effects on the
system are assessed. This analysis should lead to hazards
previously identified. Several models are necessary to per-
form this study, and each designer has to provide models
from his domain: electronic, electrical, computer and me-
chanical. It is also possible to analyze human error. A
FMECA is appropriate when the analysis has progressed to
the point where hardware and software items may be eas-
ily identified in UML diagrams. Therefore, UML diagrams
presented here belong to the analysis model (whereas pre-
vious diagrams were requirement diagrams).
Mechanical component analysis
It is possible to perform a risk analysis on mechanical units
based on block diagrams or other mechanical notations.
There isn’t any UML diagram that can be directly used for
mechanical notation. However, it is possible to represent
units with object diagrams. Figure 9 represents the main
physical units of the slave robot with an UML object di-
agram (similar in this form to a block diagram). Based
on this diagram it is possible to perform a FMECA. For
instance, in figure 10, we can identify two failure modes
for an artificial muscle. For risk evaluation, we have used
a classic table, that permits to perform a qualitative eval-
uation. Severity, expresses the fact that the failure effect
can have a high level (1 is for death or serious harm) or
a low level (3 is for no harm). Occurrence has five lev-
els from I (improbable) to F (frequent). Risk is the prod-
uct or those two code. Then, during risk evaluation, each
risk code is analyzed in order to decide if the risk is ac-
ceptable. Important points are highlighted during FMECA.
For instance, we had to determine the occurrence of failure
modes (more than one time per year for Muscle pierced and
never for Breaking), the decrease of pressure for Muscle
pierced (at least a decrease of 0.6 Bar from a control com-
mand of 1 Bar), and life cycle of artificial muscles (still in
study). In the last column, the Action required point means
that the air pressure has to be removed from all the artifi-
cial muscles. In this case, the state of the TER slave robot
is changed. This is modelled with a state diagram as in fig-
ure 11. Based on this diagram it is possible to represent all
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Figure 10 : Example of a FMECA table for a mechanical unit
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Figure 11 : Reduced state diagram
the states but also the events causing a state transition.
In case of Failure of a muscle (see fig. 11), the system
changes in state Verification. If it is impossible to easily re-
pair, this means that the examination must be stopped (End
of use state). Another important state is the emergency
stop. This state can be reached by any other states dur-
ing use of TER (modelled as Active state). The transition
only depends on the Operator, he must push an emergency
button. By definition emergency stop cannot be a software
measure, this condition was the same for industrial robots.
In our case, if power (air and electricity) is removed from
TER control system, the muscle length increases and then
the pressure on patient decreases to zero.
Electronic components analysis
Figure 12 illustrates a part of the electronic components of
the slave TER control system with a deployment diagram.
Electric parts can also be integrated in this diagram. Based
on this diagram it is possible to specify for each stereo-
type (a well known component who belongs to a class of
devices, as a «sensor», an «actuator», etc.) a set of fail-
ure modes. For instance a «sensor» has failure modes as:
frozen, biased, run-away, or spike. Therefore, it is possible
to associate UML stereotype to failure modes for FMECA.
We present the analysis of failure modes of the control sys-
tem processor (WinNT/RTx) in figure 13. Those two fail-
ure modes can be both controlled with well-known safety
patterns. First, a Random output, can be controlled with a
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Figure 12 : Deployment diagram of the slave TER Control Sys-
tem
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Figure 13 : FMECA table for control system processor
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Figure 14 : Sequence diagram: watchdog pattern from [7]
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Figure 15 : State diagram of slave TER control system
dual channel for control as presented in [19]. In this case,
there is two control subsystems (also called channel1 and
channel2) calculating command position values and a com-
parison is then applied. This safety pattern can be modelled
in UML and is presented in [7]. The other failure mode can
be controlled with the use of a watchdog, described in fig-
ure 14. As long as Subsystem requires service (Stroke mes-
sage) to the Watchdog, nothing happens. This design mea-
sure can be hardware or software. In our case, a possible
action is to implement an external watchdog, i.e. an hard-
ware device. This safety measure should be modelled in
the deployment diagram in figure 12 (no represented here).
Relationships between units must also be analyzed. Only
represented with stereotypes (as «RS232») or comments (as
network), they can also failed. For instance, the control sys-
tem must change state in cause of network failure occurring
during Motion control. The motion is frozen for a while un-
til the connection is established. This is modelled in figure
15. New states have been added to the previous state dia-
gram (see fig. 11. The Emergency stop is not represented
in this diagram for readability but it nevertheless exists.
Software analysis
FMECA applied to software is still in study. Indeed, it is
impossible to calculate the occurrence of a software error,
and then to decide if the risk is acceptable. Therefore, eval-
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Figure 17 : FMECA table for the position controller
uation is performed by the designer, who decide to imple-
ment fault tolerant mechanisms or not. A first way is to
consider software as a component and to analyze only its
outputs. In this case classical measures, as redundancy,
polling systems, watchdog subsystems, etc, can be used
to guarantee a risk reduction. But those solutions are not
easy to implement because of complexity, time and cost. A
second way can be an analysis of the software in several
units. Based on class diagrams and on sequence diagram,
it is then possible to identify some failure modes and their
effects. FMECA in this case is useful to identify crit-
ical units. For instance, the class Position controller (in
figure 16) has to be studied in order to determine its robust-
ness. The FMECA table in figure 17 illustrate this analysis.
Some design choices can nevertheless be integrated in this
analysis (as the Digital filter in the last column).
: Localizer
: Operator
: 3D sensor: Patient Model: HMI
Start calibrate
patient model Create (number of
points)
Moves 3D sensor on patient body
Read 3D position
Localize
Read 3D position
Read 3D position
Localize
Localize
Calculate model
Show patient model3D representation of
patient
Validate
Moves 3D sensor on patient body
Moves 3D sensor on patient body
ETC...
Operator points a 3D
sensor on patient body.
Localizer furnishes 3D
position of the
sensor. The model is
calculated with a limited
number of 3D points.
Figure 18 : Sequence diagram of the action "Calibrate for patient corpulence" (see g.7)
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Figure 19 : Sequence diagram of the control motion in teleoperation
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Figure 20 : Human failure for "Calibrate for patient corpulence"
Human component analysis
Human errors can be identified as exposed previously in
section 3.3.1. In figure 18 we have refined the message
Calibrate for patient corpulence represented on sequence
diagram in figure 7. An error that can be identified, is a re-
alization error (bad manipulation of the 3D sensor), noted
as a failure mode. In this case, the object Patient model is
wrong. And we can see on the figure 19, that this model is
used in order to calculate the Geometrical model. Then, it
will produce a bad regulation of the robot position. In order
to limit this error, the operator must have the possibility to
stop calibration and to do it again. We have not represented
this scenario, but it can be easily done with sequence dia-
gram. The table of figure 20, illustrates this analysis. An
action is here to let the operator to decide if the model is
correct or not by a validation step (last column).
4. Conclusion
Medical robots belong today to safety critical systems.
Therefore, their development process must include a risk
management activity. Risk analysis is described in medi-
cal and generic norms as the core of this activity. We have
used this technique to the TER project, with two contribu-
tions. First the integration of human factors in risk analysis
is not obvious and still in study. Second, we proposed to
use UML as the language for the requirements and analysis
modelling.
In the robotics field, and particularly for medical
robots, UML can be useful to model requirements integrat-
ing human factors. Activities as task analysis and function
allocation, which are critical for safety, depend on commu-
nication between engineers, doctors, or any other actors.
UML, as an human centered language, and with its graph-
ical notation is really useful for those activities. UML can
also model several fields as electronics and computer sci-
ence. Nevertheless, mechanical modelling is hardly per-
formed. An important point, is that this notation can be
used from requirements to design. This permits to guar-
antee a complete and consistent modelling from require-
ments to design, and particularly for medical specific re-
quirements. UML models, in an object-oriented modelling,
can also be used in an FMECA, even if this technique was
first used with functional models.
Following the method presented in this paper, the
number of diagram can quickly increase and it is impor-
tant to decide which ones are the most important for safety.
This can only be done if the analyst knows UML notation.
But UML has now became a standard for system defini-
tion and more and more analysts use it. For a risk analysis,
UML diagram don’t provide any tools or guidelines in or-
der to identify failure propagation on objects and effects on
the system. We performed this analysis qualitatively by in-
terpreting sequence and state diagrams. FMECA is useful
to determine component failure effects, but don’t analyze
failure and events interactions as Fault Tree Analysis does
it. We are still studying how FTA can be useful for those
tasks based on UML diagrams.
Finally, we can say that such an analysis is mostly
qualitative. The main problem is that it is difficult to quan-
tify probability of a failure or an event. Risk is often eval-
uated with qualitative metrics. This is particularly true for
software analysis, where it is impossible to evaluate any
failure rate. This led to a different approach; instead of
controlling risk of a system, it is now experimented to con-
trol the manner the system was produced, i.e. to control the
development process. This paper is closed to this concept.
Moreover, certification, which is an important concern for
today medical robots, is based on the same principle. A
further work consists in complete our safety analysis, but
also to study how our results can contribute to a certifica-
tion process for medical robots.
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